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Abstract 
The Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOA) introduced significant changes to financial practice and corporate 
governance regulation, including stringent new rules designed to protect investors by improving the 
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures. Briefly speaking, it requires management to submit a 
report containing an assessment of the effectiveness of the internal control structure, a description of 
material weaknesses in such internal controls and of any material noncompliance. Such mandatory 
regulations can have some broader ramifications on firm profitability, market structure and social 
welfare, many of which were unintended when policy makers first formulated this Act. Moreover, the 
tight coupling between compliance activities, information disclosure and IT investments can have 
implications for IT governance because of its potential to change relationships between technology 
investments and business. This article aims to provide some intuitive insights into the trade-offs 
involved for firms in disclosure of such information, and gives an overview of some research 
questions that would be of interest to academics, industry executives and policy makers alike. 
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1. Introduction 
The Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act was formulated to increase companies’ compliance with SEC 
disclosure laws. In the aftermath of Enron, World Com, Tyco and other high-profile business scandals 
between December 2001 and June 2002, Congress rapidly approved the passage of the SOX Act 
(SOA). What prompted the government to create this provision was a concern stemming from the lack 
of sufficient controls at these scandal-ridden firms, and the need for firms’ financial statements to be 
accurate and devoid of any kind of accounting manipulation. Thus, the SOX Act required managers to 
implement controls over the financial reporting process and state whether they were effective.  
 
In particular, the SOX Act introduced significant changes to financial practice and corporate 
governance regulation, including stringent new rules designed to protect investors by improving the 
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws. Perhaps the part 
of the Act having the most impact was Section 404. Section 404 requires management to submit to the 
SEC with the company’s annually filed financial statements, an internal control report, which shall 
state the responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control 
structure and procedures for financial reporting. It should also contain an assessment, as of the end of 
the fiscal year, of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures for financial 
reporting. It also requires auditors to attest to, and report on the management’s assessment of the 
internal control systems. Such reports should include a description of material weaknesses in such 
internal controls and of any material noncompliance. Furthermore, where significant deficiencies 
exist, they need to be identified as required under SOX. For an interesting study that examined the 
cause of significant deficiencies in internal control that required identification, see Ge and McVay 
(2005). They found that poor internal control is related to “an insufficient commitment of resources 
for accounting controls”. An example of a statement contained within the internal control report 
provided by corporations is provided below. 
 
• An evaluation of the effectiveness ….disclosure controls and procedures…was performed… 
..with the participation of the Company’s Management, … these …are effective to provide 
reasonable assurance that information required to be disclosed by the Company ..is accumulated 
and communicated to the Company’s Management …to allow timely decisions regarding required 
disclosure and …to provide reasonable assurance that such information is recorded, processed, 
summarized and reported within the time periods. 
- Wal-Mart Stores Inc- March 31, 20052 
 
Since modern financial reporting systems are heavily dependant on technology and associated 
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controls, any review of internal controls would not be complete without addressing controls around 
information security. An insecure system would not be considered a source of reliable financial 
information because of the possibility of unauthorized transactions or data manipulation, each of 
which can compromise data integrity. The SOX Act focuses on management accountability and 
operating efficiencies in firms. Both of these are tightly coupled with investments in IT and the role 
played by IT professionals. Indeed, sections 302 and 404 indirectly force the scrutiny of information 
security controls for SOX compliance.3 The implication of these new regulations is that organizations, 
especially those dealing with financial information, must establish the appropriate processes and 
technologies to evaluate data usage requirements for all users and create a data usage control policy 
that defines how data may be used by each user. They need to record database activity and report on 
deviations from the data usage control policy. Further, they need to alert management when a 
deviation from usage control policy might violate data integrity.  
 
There’s been a lot of debate about the impact of new government and industry regulations on IT 
departments, especially in the financial services sector. The financial services sector has long been 
presumed to practice superior information security, largely because of the preciousness of its assets 
and the fact that its business is carried out almost entirely on IT systems. A study based on interviews 
with 100 IT managers in UK financial services companies reveals that given the current level of 
investment in technologies that help companies comply with regulations such as SOX, around 60% of 
IT managers from financial services companies believe the demand on IT to deal with compliance 
issues will increase over the coming three years (Carr 2006). Indeed, the study states that most 
respondents are not satisfied with their current capabilities to perform tasks necessary for compliance 
such as document management and archiving. Further, it also reports that “most financial companies 
are only just beginning to scratch the surface in areas such as the archiving of electronic messages and 
digitized phone records.” This becomes even more important in the face of a recent study that shows 
how susceptible the financial services industry is to targeted scans and probing attacks (Schneier 
2005). Counterpane tracked the thirteen major vertical markets using attack data between January 
2005 and October 2005. The study found although the financial industry ranks second highest in 
attacks, it is actually the most vulnerable to security breach activity—approximately 50% of all 
targeted scans detected by Counterpane occurred within the financial industry. 
  
It’s well known that internal control evaluation and responsibilities are not a new mandate on business 
in the US. For instance, the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 requires publicly held 
companies to maintain adequate system of internal control. Further, the evaluation by external 
auditors has been an integral part of firm audit for many years. However, prior to Section 404, the 
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audit evaluation of internal control was optional and might have been avoided, for example, for 
efficiency or size reasons. There was no requirement to disclose publicly the findings from the 
internal control evaluation. Post-SOX these disclosures are mandatory. Recently, a number of trade 
press article have voiced for a rollback of portions of the SOX Act, citing Section 404 as imprudent 
act of overregulation and called for its repeal. This article lays out some potential trade-offs to 
companies that have resulted from the SOX Act and its implications on firm profits, industry structure 
and competition, and social welfare.  
1.1 Perceived Costs & Benefits 
SOX has made companies place more emphasis on the reliability, security and accuracy of their 
systems. Companies need to understand how their back office systems support financial data 
processing - and show that they have the right IT governance in place. Compliance with SOX 
regulations requires significant, non-recurring costs “upfront” investment. Costs are quantifiable and 
immediate, whereas benefits are intangible and more difficult to quantify. First, there is a strong 
learning curve for all registrants and auditors. Audit committees need to spend more time in 
compliance activities. Then, there are significant fixed costs such as initial documentation, initial 
remediation of deficiencies (potential deferred maintenance), training efforts, developing overall 
project and testing plans. None of these processes are stationary though. This implies that the current 
documentation may change next year as business processes and business controls change from year to 
year. A company must test each of its controls each year. Intangible costs include delays in decision 
making due to increase in risk averseness of the top management. And, most importantly, given fixed 
budget constraints, these mandatory investments in SOX compliance technologies and systems can 
potentially lead to compromises in the level of IT security spending.  
 
A survey of 224 public companies by Financial Executive International (FEI) in July 2004, found that 
the average cost of complying with Section 404 is approximately $ 4 million, and that the average 
cost varies with firm size. According to a report by the Big Four Accounting firms, the average cost of 
compliance with Section 404 in 2004 for a fortune 1000 company is $7.8 million. A study by the law 
firm of Foley and Lardner found the Act increased costs associated with being a publicly held 
company by 130 percent. Many of the major problems stem from section 404 of SOX, which requires 
CEOs to certify the accuracy of financial statements.  
 
In addition to the direct cost of implementing a system that achieves compliance with SOX, the 
workload and risk of directors has increased as a result of the regulation. This, in turn, has lead to an 
increase in the fees paid to directors. Further, the increase is disproportionately high on small firms. 
Linck, Netter, and Yang (2005) estimate that, from 2001 to 2004, small firms had to pay higher 
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director fees to the tune of $0.84 per $1,000 in net sales, whereas for large firms the corresponding 
increase was just $0.07.  
 
While the implementation costs of Section 404 is quite significant, the benefits might be harder to 
estimate. Specifically, its not quite clear if announcements of material weaknesses by companies are 
informative to equity investors, creditors and regulatory agencies. Indeed, anecdotal evidence in this 
regard is quite mixed: A Goldman Sachs study found that 12 % negative stock price reaction to a 
disclosure of internal control deficiencies by a small-cap firm (Flowserve) but a positive reaction to a 
disclosure by Eastman Kodak of a forthcoming adverse SOX 404 opinion. The Wall Street Journal 
(April 14, 2005) reported that the credit rating agency take negative action against about 20% of 
companies reporting a material weakness.  
 
To be fair, SOX Act can have a number of expected benefits. First, it could lead to greater 
accountability, ownership and appreciation of internal control systems throughout all levels of an 
organization. Second, it can lead to more timely identification and remediation of internal control 
weaknesses that might not have been detected otherwise. Thus, the benefits of improved corporate 
controls are expected to be found not only in decreased malfeasance, but perhaps even more so in a 
substantial increase in corporate data quality, the decrease of instances of erroneous intra- and extra-
corporate transactions.  
 
The above information then highlights that there are distinct trade-offs involved in such mandatory 
accounting information disclosure regulations. This paves the way for a set of research questions 
which might of interest to academics and executives alike. Some of these are outlined below.  
2. Research Questions 
1. Sarbanes-Oxley requirements are causing companies to reconsider public status. Is that 
detrimental for social welfare?  
 
The SOX Act was designed to restore investor confidence and prevent the type of corporate 
malfeasance that has plagued the U.S. capital markets in recent years. While few would argue with the 
assertion that the SOX regulations have increased corporate transparency and enhanced corporate 
governance, it has become increasingly clear that these improvements are creating a 
disproportionately heavy burden on small public companies. The costs of complying with the SOX 
Act, however, are borne by all public companies. Thus, it seems to have a major negative impact as 
well: namely reduction in companies going public with their IPOs and increase in acquisitions. Indeed 
in 2005, 33% of the 18 withdrawn stock offerings – including IPOs, secondary offerings and 
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convertible-stock deals – were put on hold because the issuers began discussions to be acquired 
instead (Dealogic 2005). That has increased from 2004, when 18% of the 97 withdrawn deals were 
due to acquisition discussions, and 2003, when 16% of 67 deals were pulled for that reason. Thus, the 
backlash from the legislative penalty may be worse than the crime it was intended to prevent. One 
explanation for the exodus from the public market and increase in acquisitions is to avoid the burden 
of complying with the SOX Act regulations. The added time, expense and managerial hassle to small 
companies may be tipping the decision away from a public offering.4  
 
In a number of press releases announcing the decision to deregister a firm’s stock, managers typically 
cite the high costs of reporting as the key motivation for “going dark” as it is quite commonly known. 
Additionally recent empirical studies (Lieuz et al. 2004) have shown that the SOX Act maybe the 
driving force behind the decision of many companies to go deregister or go dark. A major finding in 
their paper is that smaller firms for which reporting costs may be particularly burdensome, are more 
likely to take such steps. If the market views the deregistration decision as conveying additional 
information about a firm’s weak future growth prospects, this can become a vicious cycle where 
investors pull out their stocks even more quickly. In fact, Lieuz et al. (2004) note that shareholders 
might even turn skeptical, if they start viewing deregistration as a tool for management to hide poor 
performance to protect themselves from legal liability (especially post-SOX).  
 
These trends demonstrate that the SOX Act may even be altering the operation of capital markets. 
This may not only affect US firms directly but may also have an impact on the number of foreign 
investors in US markets. In fact, given these mandatory regulations, many foreign firms may not be 
willing to enter or stay in the US markets (HRO Alert 2005). Even with the SEC’s partial exemption 
of the compliance requirements of foreign companies, some of them may stay away from US markets 
because of the tougher accounting rules and heightened emphasis on corporate governance. Thus, the 
SOX Act throws up interesting implications of this act on the net social welfare generated not just 
from product markets but also from the interactions with capital markets. Does a decreases in 
participation in public markets, or an increase in the number of acquisitions adversely affect welfare? 
What are the plausible outcomes? The jury is still out on these questions.  
 
2. By creating an artificial incentive for firms to merge, is the law impeding market 
competition?  
 
According to several CEOs, the SOX Act does stifle intra-industry competition. According to the 
                                                 
4One could also argue that SOX could have a negative influence on corporate mergers and acquisitions because 
acquiring firms may be wary of the financial liability they could assume for the private companies they acquire. 
Anecdotal or empirical evidence to support this assertion is little or non-existent, though. 
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AeA, the largest trade association for the high-technology sector, Section 404 has become problematic 
because the cost burden amounts to a major regressive tax on small business, given that the cost is not 
directly proportionate to revenue (AeA 2005). For multi-billion dollar companies, the cost may run at 
approximately 0.05 percent of revenue, but for small companies with revenues below $20 million, the 
costs can rapidly approach three percent of revenue. At the micro level, anecdotal evidence reveals 
that for a large company the cost of Section 404 is approximately $400 per employee, whereas, for 
small companies, the cost in many instances approaches $4,000 per employee. However, external 
auditors have generally adopted a “one size fits all” approach to Section 404. This means that a small 
company (in terms of revenue) and a relatively simple organizational structure essentially is being 
held to the same standard as a large multi-billion dollar company with a very complicated 
organizational structure. The SEC believed there would be “a direct correlation between the extent of 
the burden and the size of the reporting company, with the burden increasing commensurate with the 
size of the company.” But the opposite appears to be true.  
 
While the federal government acknowledges the ways in which SOX raises the costs of doing 
business, they also feel these costs are more than offset by the benefits of improved accounting 
practices and greater public trust in the corporate world. A lack of public trust tends to boost a firm’s 
cost of capital. Hence, by increasing the level of consumer trust SOX Act can mitigate concerns on 
the cost side as well. However, there are hidden dangers. SOX Act requires top managers to certify 
the veracity of their financial statements. The additional liabilities imposed on managers can increase 
agency costs by forcing executives to invest effort in less monitored activities. In the context of 
today’s economy, an attempt by a firm’s management to exercise an extra degree of prudence in 
equipment spending and hiring behavior will, in the end, if practiced widely enough, produce a more 
risk averse top management. Hence, it may reduce production and innovation throughout the 
economy. It is reasonable to hypothesize that business activity will be reduced, not necessarily to 
recession levels, but to levels well below the economy’s underlying dynamic potential (were 
corporate behavior less risk averse). Indeed Cohen et al.(2004) hypothesize and find that there was a 
significant decline in research and development expenses and capital expenditures made by CEOs 
after the passage of the SOX Act. Related to the above point, if some companies were to pass their 
administrative costs of SOX compliance to customers by increasing prices, it might end up making 
the company less competitive in the marketplace, thereby having negative consequences on social 
welfare.  
 
3. Can Sarbanes-Oxley compliance compromise IT security? Given the resource constraints a 
firm faces, what are the optimal levels of investment in technologies which boost SOX compliance? 
How should a firm allocate resources between IT security spending, SOX compliance spending and 
other regular expenditures such as product development/R & D/marketing?  
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CEOs and boards of directors now care, more than ever, about software and systems that will help 
them comply with SOX. Specifically, the tenets of SOX Act specify that corporate governance be 
responsible for providing transparency, integrity, and accountability over regulated financial data. As 
with most laws of this type, regulatory compliance only establishes a base line and is just a start to 
ethical corporate governance and financial conduct. Also, given the high stakes involved firms are 
also considering outsourcing some of the software systems development to companies that already 
have the expertise in secure coding techniques. In addition, firms could in principle, also explore the 
role that application security products could play in reducing time to be compliant.  
 
However, investing in compliance technologies is like a double edged sword. Devoting time and 
money to SOX Act compliance limits other activities for which those resources could have been 
used— for instance, in critical technology investments and infrastructure protection which boost IT 
security (more on this later). Additionally, as companies scrutinize their internal controls and become 
more conscious of the processes used to make decisions, they may become more risk-averse and 
slower to seize opportunities (HRO Alert 2005). The pressures of dealing with the SOX Act are 
forcing most firms to divert their spending away from security, according to a report released by the 
Internet Security Forum (ISF). ISF surveyed several Fortune 500 firms, and found that a majority of 
the firms are decreasing their security budgets to ensure SOX compliance. A recent report by Red 
Siren (2005) which surveyed Chief Security Officers (CSOs) mentions similar findings. 62% of the 
participants said they are having to spend more time complying with government regulations such as 
Sarbanes-Oxley and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and less time on activities actually protecting their 
networks. More than one-third ([38%) of the respondents said such mandatory regulations have 
caused them to either divert or delay new IT security projects. Getronics (2005) reports a similar 
finding by Gartner Research analysts.  
 
It has been reported in the media that SOX regulations create fear among management that they are 
exposing themselves to second-guessing when making business decisions, raising the hurdle for 
businesses to make investments. And raising the hurdle rates implies that “some investments that 
should have been undertaken, that would have been good for society, good for investors, good for 
shareholders, and good for the economy’s growth, won’t be undertaken.”5 Moreover, many 
companies are delaying the implementation of significant IT projects by six to nine months solely 
because of the documentation and testing requirements of Section 404. Many firms also expect this 
problem to persist, and predict that they will be able to make major systems changes only in the first 
half of their fiscal years going forward. As a result, Section 404 requirements seem to be significantly 
                                                 
5A Sense of Siege. MSNBC (January 7, 2005) 
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inhibiting business operations and having an impact on the competitiveness of companies.  
 
4. How does compliance affect the security of critical infrastructure assets?  
 
Certain industries are very critical to our nationwide security because of their intimate connection to 
critical infrastructure assets. According to the DHS (Department of Homeland Security), critical 
infrastructure includes “cyber assets both technology-based, physical and logical which are so vital 
that their infiltration, incapacitation, destruction or misuse would have a debilitating impact on the 
health, safety, welfare or economic of US citizens.” The financial services industry, which is privy to 
the sensitive information about consumers is also most susceptible to cyber-security breaches. Given 
the increasing pervasiveness of storing data in digital form and the importance of confidential 
personal information, a major breach of client data could not only impact a financial services 
organization’s financial performance, but also severely cripple the security of critical infrastructure 
industries. Publicly traded financial services organizations need to keep extensive records and 
documentation of internal controls to comply with the SOX Act. A security breach in a critical 
infrastructure industry, such as banking, may adversely affect producers and consumers in other 
industries. The shift in management attention from protecting critical cyber-infrastructure to investing 
in compliance and internal control may derail other IT projects (Agostino 2004) and impinge on the 
overall security of the industry. The resultant ripple effects can have grave consequences on national 
security. The management has to have a careful understanding of how to allot resources to different 
business units in order to balance the various investments.  
 
Related to this is the question of “externalities” which arise when cost and benefits of investments are 
harder to quantify. This is certainly true of information security investments. For example, while a 
significant terrorist attack undermines the nation’s sovereignty, the costs associated with such an 
attack may be difficult to quantify. In economics, such an attack is defined as imposing a “negative 
externality.” The presence of this negative externality means that private markets will under 
investment in security than the socially optimal level. This is because firms deciding how best to 
protect themselves against terrorism are unlikely to take the external costs of an attack fully into 
account, and therefore will generally provide an inefficiently low level of security against terrorism on 
their own (Orzag 2003). Without government involvement, private markets will thus typically under-
invest in anti-terrorism measure. In such contexts information sharing may act as a panacea; Gal-Or 
and Ghose (2005) find that security technology investments and security information sharing act as 
“strategic complements” in equilibrium. On the other hand, information sharing can also lead to a 
free-riding problem (Gordon, Loeb and Lucyshyn 2003).  
 
5. How does mandatory information disclosure affect a firm’s intellectual property?  
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SOX can have a major impact on the importance and management of intangible assets such as 
intellectual property (IP). In fact, among SOX’s accounting mandates are specific requirements on 
companies to report on the value of their IP and to annually audit their IP. Given the intricate interplay 
between intellectual property and SOX, companies are beginning to appreciate the role of intellectual 
property in financial performance. Under SOX, firms need to be diligent in disclosing and certifying 
their tangible and intangible assets in all financial reports. They must identify and list their important 
IP assets, value them, link those assets to the financial performance and operation of the company, 
and disclose any impairment to them (Foley and Lardner 2005). IP assets are to be audited annually to 
determine if there has been any impairment or loss that needs to be accounted for. Patent and 
trademark portfolios, for example, need to be decomposed and allocated to associated cost and 
revenue streams. This implies tracking changes in the legal landscape, such as potential claims of 
intellectual property infringement, changes in competitor intellectual property portfolios, amendments 
to the scope of patent or trademark applications or patent and trademark validity challenges, and 
changes in intellectual property law (Blair 2005). 
 
Given these scenarios, measurements undertaken to safeguard IP are part of the controls that must be 
certified by a company under SOX regulations. In many firms, this is bringing forth a need to 
formalize and update their IP management processes to better track the IP along with other assets. 
Rather than having the legal team bear sole responsibility, multidisciplinary teams are being created to 
review and assess the company’s IP-related contracts, including non-disclosure, employment and 
licensing agreements.6  
 
Several questions can arise in this context. For example, how do intellectual property infringers affect 
the financial prospects of a firm? Or for a given level of information disclosure and investments in 
compliance, what is the potential for infringement damages and how may that impair current and 
future intellectual property? What are the potential liabilities if a firm has inadequate controls in place 
and more importantly, how does one measure such IP related liabilities and reflect the losses in the 
mandatory periodic reports? Moreover, what are the specific kinds of information that should be 
disclosed when disclosure is mandatory? Can these disclosures serve the purpose of alerting auditors, 
managers, and investors?7 
3. Prior Literature 
Questions on information disclosure, economic incentives, and social welfare, similar to those noted 
                                                 
6Sarbanes-Oxley and Your Company’s. IP 4/19/2006. www.jenner.com/news 
7 I think an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this. 
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above, have been previously studied in the context of other organizations. This earlier work is able to 
shed light on building appropriate theoretical frameworks to answer these questions. Of particular 
relevance, in this regard, is the extensive literature in conflicts where researchers have studied the 
optimal allocation of scarce resources by firms, given resource constraints (see for example, 
Hirshleifer 1989, Hausken 2005). An additional stream of literature in accounting has analyzed the 
trade-offs faced by firms in disclosing and presenting financial information (Hirshleifer and Teo 
2003). Earlier work in finance has tried to establish a link between financial reporting and economic 
consequences (Demski and Feltham 1994). There is no empirical agreement on whether firms are 
more likely to disclose good news or bad news. Indeed depending on size, firms use different 
disclosure strategies if the costs and benefits associated with disclosure and nondisclosure vary with 
firm size. For example, class action law suits are more probable and more costly for large firms as a 
result of the method of legal damage estimation (Skinner 1997; Beaver and Marlernee 1990). Based 
on this observation, Tucker and Zorowin (2006) argue that larger firms are more likely to predisclose 
bad news. On the other hand, Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) show that the marginal benefit of 
increased disclosure increases with firm size. The intuition is that increased disclosures are expected 
to increase market depth and thereby attract large-traders, who are often associated with larger firms. 
Their theory predicts that irrespective of the kind of news, larger firms are more likely to make 
disclosures than are smaller firms. For a detailed review of the empirical disclosure literature, see 
Healy and Palepu (2001), and Core (2001).  
 
The kind of questions asked in this article can build on the recent literature on security information 
disclosure and sharing, that analyzes the cost and benefits from enrolling in Information Sharing and 
Analysis Centers (ISACs). The U.S. federal government has encouraged the formation of ISACs, with 
the goal of helping to protect critical infrastructure assets that are largely owned and operated by the 
private sector. This has been witnessed in variety of industries such as IT, chemicals, oil & gas, 
electricity, transportation etc. For instance, members of the Financial Services Information Sharing 
and Analysis Center (FS/ISAC) receive timely notification and authoritative information specifically 
designed to help protect critical systems and assets from physical and cyber security threats. ISACs 
provide “vertical” systems for exchange of sector-specific information and ideas within Critical 
Infrastructures (CI). Companies that participate in ISACs work with their Sector Coordinating 
Councils (SCCs) and the Sector-Specific Agencies (SSAs) and are required to reveal information 
about security breaches and vulnerabilities to a central monitoring organization (Gordon, Loeb and 
Lucyshyn 2003, Gal-Or and Ghose 2003, Gal-Or and Ghose 2005). The underlying assumption is that 
such centrally coordinated information sharing organizations would facilitate the alignment of goals 
for both the private sector and the federal government, which in turn would improve the security of 
cyber-infrastructure assets (Gal-Or and Ghose 2003).  
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The interesting parallels can be drawn with compliance regulation because of the underlying nature of 
internal vulnerability and weakness reporting. Gal-Or and Ghose (2005) show that security 
information sharing alliances yield greater benefits in more competitive industries. Firms generally 
respond to increased competition with aggressive price cuts. In order to alleviate such aggressive price 
competition, firms have greater incentives to invest in mechanisms that alleviate price competition. 
Since increases in information sharing may help in mitigating price competition, firms decide to raise 
the extent of information sharing and investments when the degree of competition between them 
increases. Gal-Or and Ghose (2005) also highlight that the benefits from such information-sharing 
about internal security breaches and vulnerabilities increase with the size of the firm. Arora et al. 
(2004) provides a decision framework for understanding how disclosure timing may affect vendor’s 
decision and in turn, what policy makers should do. They show that vendors always choose to patch 
after disclosure, and that the social planner can optimally shrink the time window of disclosure to 
push vendors to deliver patch in a timely manner. Cavusoglu et al. (2005) study what the optimal 
disclosure policies should be when vulnerability affects multiple vendors and shed light on social 
welfare implications of an early warning system which provide vulnerability information to some 
selected users.  
 
On the empirical front, a number of studies have demonstrated the adverse effect of security breach 
disclosure on the stock market prices of firms and vendors (Campbell et al. 2003, Cavusoglu et al. 
2004, Telang and Wattal 2005). The insights from these studies can be used to predict the possible 
consequences of disclosing internal vulnerability on stock prices. Perhaps the most relevant paper to 
this article is Gordon et al. (2006) who empirically examine the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) of 2002 on the voluntary disclosure of information security activities by corporations and find 
evidence that clearly indicates that SOX is having a positive impact on such disclosure. Although, an 
increase in voluntary disclosures of information security activities by corporations does not prove that 
the  activities have actually increased (since activities could remain the same, while the disclosures of 
such activities have increased), it provides indirect evidence that such activities are receiving more 
focus since the passage of SOX (Gordon et al. 2006). 
4. Economic Modeling of the Problem 
Several of these questions are inherently empirical in nature. And some of these empirical studies can 
be complemented by looking at specific case-studies. On the other hand, analytical models can also be 
built towards providing many interesting and intuitive insights into these issues. How can one model 
these phenomena and answer the above questions? It is probably too ambitious to hope that a single 
model can provide suggestive answers to all of them. Instead we focus on a subset of problems. Let us 
take an example. Suppose one is interested in issues pointed out in (3). In the simplest possible 
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formulation, one can analyze a market consisting of two firms producing a differentiated product in a 
two-stage non-cooperative game as in the standard model of Cournot or Bertrand competition (Tirole 
1992). In the first stage, firms choose optimal levels of SOX compliance technology investment and 
material weakness disclosure levels, such that the rest of the resources from the IT budget are plugged 
back into IT security investments. In the second stage, they could choose prices or quantities. Firms 
face a linear demand curve, with the demand of each firm depending on its own price and the price of 
its competitor. The demand functions for the firms can be assumed to be linear in self and cross-price 
effects. In this context, we can examine how the effect of information disclosure on profits and social 
welfare, is affected by firm and market characteristics. Recent work in the economics of IT security 
has used similar frameworks to analyze the effect of security information sharing decisions (Gal-Or 
and Ghose 2005, Ghose and Rajan 2006, Ghose and Hausken 2006).  
 
The demand function should have two components: a benefit function, B and a cost function, C. Both 
the benefit and the cost components should be some function of investments in innovation and 
investments in SOX compliance. The benefits could be interpreted as increased customer confidence 
which helps in product markets by boosting demand and decreased cost of capital. On the cost side, 
there needs to be a fixed component and a variable component which increases with firm size but at a 
decreasing rate. The framework should also incorporate indirect costs which maps the loss in 
economic productivity or innovation levels for firms due to diversion of resources from those 
activities into compliance activities.  
 
Each firm has a resource constraint C, where C is some function of investments in productivity or 
innovation, I and the investments in SOX compliance X: ( )= ,C f I X . So one trade off the firms 
face is that if I increases, X will have to decrease and vice versa. However, an increase in X also 
reduces the cost of capital, which in turn can facilitate increased investments in I. So there are two 
countervailing effects of the increase in X on I. Additionally, one would need to model a trade off 
between investments in capital markets and product markets (Evans and Sridhar 2002). Further, it 
might be important to incorporate a parameter which models the “maturity” of the industry. For 
instance, the impact of SOX on the bio-tech industry will probably be different than that from a more 
mature industry such as oil & gas. This parameter will map whether the industry is more prone to 
IPOs, start-ups, and whether it is more susceptible to acquisitions & mergers.  
5. Conclusion 
In hopes of restoring investor’s faith in corporate America, SOX established significant changes in 
both management’s reporting responsibilities. An unanimous consensus is that regulations such as the 
SOX, California SB 1386, and the GLB amongst others, are having an enormous impact on 
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organizations. To meet the aggressive deadlines of these regulations, firms in several industries, 
including financial services, have invested significantly in consulting, auditors, and new business 
processes to foster disclosure of material weakness and ensure internal control. A number of recent 
studies have shown that SOX compliance comes with a high price tag. Companies face both direct 
(quantifiable) and indirect (non-quantifiable) costs such as increased D&O insurance premiums, 
higher directors fees as a result of greater time commitments and responsibilities, larger expenses 
related to internal control software and higher costs relating to consulting fees. An important aspect of 
these costs is that they are not proportional to the size of the organization. Consequently, smaller 
firms are being more adversely affected than larger firms. 
 
There is no question that SOX is having a big impact on IT governance. While corporate executives 
agree that restoring investor confidence is in the best interest of the economy, they disagree on the 
actual cost and benefits of SOX compliance. The regulations accruing from the SOX Act have forced 
companies to undertake a series of dramatic changes in the way they appropriate resources to key 
activities such as IT security. In many firms, critical resources are being diverted away from regular 
projects to expedite compliance, and several business units are reeling from its impact. Moreover, 
critics argue that although SOX has raised the level of disclosure, the readjustment of costs affects a 
company’s global competitiveness (Lowengrub 2005). If firms end up passing their compliance costs 
onto customers by increasing prices, it will make them less competitive in the marketplace, especially 
with respect to foreign firms that are not subject to SOX. Furthermore, it is plausible that restraints 
from internal controls reduce the flexibility to respond to customer concerns. Moreover, the tight 
coupling between compliance activities, information disclosure and IT security, can have implications 
for IT governance because of its potential to change relationships between technology investments 
and business. Thus, such mandatory regulations can have some broader ramifications on firm 
profitability, market structure and social welfare, many of which were unintended when policy makers 
first formulated this Act.  
 
The aim of this article is not to criticize such regulations. Rather, this article aims to provide some 
intuitive insights into the trade offs involved for firms and lays the ground for some research 
questions that would be of interest to academics, industry executives and policy makers alike. It 
would be interesting to address some of these questions in future research, and we hope that it also 
spurs some more new exciting research along the way.  
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